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          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1638 
 ___________ 
 
 DONNA PFENDER,  
  Appellant 
        
 v. 
 
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
RAYMOND SOBINA, Warden SCI Forest, in his individual and official capacities;  
RAYMOND LAWLER, Warden, SCI Huntingdon, in his individual and official 
capacities 
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. R.)   
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 4-09-cv-01838) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 2, 2011 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: September 6, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Donna Pfender appeals the District Court‟s entry of summary judgment for the 
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defendant prison officials in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.   
I. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we merely summarize for 
purposes of addressing the issues on appeal.  The facts are largely undisputed.  Pfender‟s 
common-law husband and daughter are incarcerated in Pennsylvania, and she is the 
president of a prisoner rights advocacy group.  In 2008, Raymond Lawler, Superintendent 
of the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Huntingdon, sent a letter to Pfender 
advising that she was barred from visiting any SCI for an indefinite period of time.  
Inmate Dwayne Hill, Pfender‟s common-law husband, had been found in possession of a 
satellite photograph showing a complete aerial view of SCI-Huntingdon‟s layout.  The 
photograph, which was discovered in an envelope during a search of Hill‟s cell, was 
deemed contraband because it could be used as an implement of escape.  An investigation 
determined that Pfender was the source of the contraband, that it was mailed from her 
address, and that she used the name “Donna Hill” on the return address in an attempt to 
disguise her identity due to her affiliation with the prisoner advocacy group.   
 Pfender denied any connection to the contraband, and she wrote a letter to 
Superintendent Lawler asking for reconsideration.  Superintendent Lawler reaffirmed the 
decision to suspend her visiting privileges.  Pfender then appealed by writing a letter to 
Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”).  Secretary Beard 
declined to reinstate Pfender‟s visiting privileges, concluding that the suspension was 
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appropriate and in accordance with DOC policy, citing both the threat to security that 
Pfender‟s actions posed at SCI-Huntingdon as well as a prior visiting room incident at 
SCI-Forest in 2007.  Secretary Beard advised that Pfender could apply for reinstatement 
of her privileges after two years.  On July 7, 2010, in response to Pfender‟s request, 
Superintendent Lawler reinstated her non-contact visiting privileges, and he advised that, 
if there were no further incidents, her contact visiting privileges would be reinstated 
automatically on January 7, 2011.  
 Pfender filed this pro se suit seeking damages and other relief under § 1983, 
arguing that the suspension of visiting privileges violated her rights to due process and 
equal protection.  She named Beard, Lawler, and the Superintendent at SCI-Forest 
(Raymond Sobina) as defendants.  Pfender filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
which the District Court denied.  Defendants moved for summary judgment after the 
close of discovery, and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting the motion.  The 
Magistrate Judge determined that there is a rational basis for limiting visits when a 
putative visitor is reasonably thought to have supplied a prison layout diagram to an 
inmate, and that a legitimate interest in preventing escapes and escape attempts justifies 
precluding inmates from having access to aerial depictions of the prison‟s layout.  The 
Magistrate Judge further concluded that Pfender was afforded adequate due process 
through the exchange of letters regarding the suspension, and that she was not denied 
equal protection because a rational basis supports the prison officials‟ decision. 
 The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and entered summary 
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judgment for defendants.  It agreed that the due process claim must fail because 
defendants had a rational basis for their actions.  The District Court noted that it is 
irrelevant whether Pfender actually sent Hill the photograph, as defendants had a 
reasonable basis for concluding that the photograph was sent by Pfender since it was 
found inside an envelope in Hill‟s cell bearing Pfender‟s identification on the return 
address.  The District Court further determined that defendants‟ actions comported with 
the flexible due process standards that the situation demanded.  With regard to equal 
protection, the District Court concluded that, because Pfender did not allege any suspect 
classification, a rational basis standard applies, and that defendants‟ decision to suspend 
visiting privileges was adequately supported.  Pfender timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review an award of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same test on review that the District Court 
should have applied.”  Burns v. Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quotation marks omitted).  “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “We review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party‟s favor.”  
Burns, 642 F.3d at 170 (quotation marks omitted). 
 Pfender challenges the entry of summary judgment primarily by disputing the 
determination that she supplied the contraband photograph to Hill.  Although the prison 
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officials investigated the matter and determined that Pfender supplied the photograph to 
Hill, Pfender suggests that Hill received the photograph from another source, presumably 
not through the mail, and that he merely chose to store the item in an old envelope that 
bore Pfender‟s name.  Pfender contends that “the logical connection between [her and] 
the item of contraband is so remote as to render her visiting ban arbitrary or irrational.”  
Appellant‟s Br. at 6.   
 We agree with the District Court that defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment.  A claimed denial of procedural due process requires a plaintiff to show that a 
protected liberty or property interest was taken in a procedurally deficient manner.  See 
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).  Any protection for 
the liberty interest that Pfender might have in visiting with inmate family members must 
derive either from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law.  See Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).  The Due Process Clause has not been held to guarantee an 
interest in prison visitation.  See Ky. Dep‟t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 
(1989) (rejecting notion that “unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due 
Process Clause”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (observing that 
“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration”).  In 
addition, Pfender has made no showing that Pennsylvania law creates a protected liberty 
interest in visiting privileges. 
 Assuming some protection for Pfender‟s right of association, such a right is 
necessarily circumscribed by the need to afford deference to prison officials in the 
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exercise of their professional judgment when pursuing legitimate penological interests.  
See Overton, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (concluding that the Court “need not attempt to 
explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent to 
which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation 
to legitimate penological interests”); see also Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 
1198 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that while “courts and commentators have observed 
that visitation may significantly benefit both the prisoner and his family … the 
Constitution allows prison officials to impose reasonable restrictions upon visitation”). 
 The suspension imposed upon Pfender was “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  Superintendent Lawler 
explained that, after an investigation, it was determined that Pfender had supplied Hill 
with an aerial photograph of the prison‟s layout.  The photograph was undeniably an item 
of contraband because an inmate could use it to plot an escape.  Pfender‟s visiting 
privileges were suspended in accordance with DOC regulations,
1
 and she was afforded an 
opportunity to seek reinstatement after two years.  We agree with the District Court that 
there is a rational basis for imposing this type of limitation upon the visiting privileges of 
an individual who is determined to have supplied an inmate with a prison layout 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Pa. DC-ADM 812.VI.A.2.i (“Any visitor‟s privileges may be limited, 
suspended, or restricted (such as non-contact visits only or a restriction on visiting at 
more than one facility) if information becomes available suggesting that allowing the 
individual to visit poses a threat to the safety and security of any Department 
facility.”); Pa. DC-ADM 812.VI.K.8 (“A visitor who is suspended or barred at one 
facility shall not be permitted to visit at any other facility.”). 
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photograph.  Prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in preventing inmates 
from possessing items that can be used to escape, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. 
Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 n.5 (3d Cir. 1976), and in restricting the visiting privileges of 
individuals determined to pose a security risk by providing such items to an inmate.
2
   
 Pfender denies having provided the photograph to Hill, but she has not pointed to 
a “material” factual dispute that would preclude an entry of summary judgment.  “A 
disputed fact is „material‟ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by the 
substantive law.”  J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., -- F.3d --, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11947, at 
*17 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).  The contraband in 
Hill‟s cell was discovered in an envelope that identified Pfender on the return address.  
While Pfender proffers alternative explanations for how Hill might have obtained the 
photograph, the evidence cited by the prison officials provides a reasonable basis for their 
conclusion that Pfender supplied the contraband.  We have explained, in conducting a 
Turner analysis at the summary judgment stage, that merely “show[ing] there are 
different views as to the relevant issues and underlying facts” is insufficient.  Williams v. 
Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2003).  Pfender‟s denial of culpability does not create 
a triable issue on the question whether the suspension of her visiting privileges bears a 
                                                 
2
 As the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court concluded in denying Pfender‟s 
mandamus petition challenging the suspension of her visiting privileges, “Pfender is 
hard-pressed to assert a constitutional right to associate with incarcerated persons 
when respondents‟ internal investigation has revealed that she is a security risk.”  
Pfender v. Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 2009 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 754, at *7 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Sept. 23, 2009) (unreported memorandum opinion). 
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rational relationship to legitimate penological interests.  On that substantive question, 
summary judgment was properly entered for defendants.
3
  
 Finally, Pfender argues that suspension of her visiting privileges violated equal 
protection because there was some unspecified “gender disparity in the [prison officials]‟ 
visiting ban practice,” and the suspension amounted to “arbitrary and irrational 
government conduct.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 9-10.  “To prevail on an equal protection claim, 
a plaintiff must present evidence that s/he has been treated differently from persons who 
are similarly situated.”  Williams, 343 F.3d at 221.  Pfender has presented no such 
evidence.  Moreover, as the District Court explained, Pfender‟s equal protection claim 
fails for the same reason that her due process claim fails:  the suspension of her visiting 
privileges was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.  See, e.g., id. 
(“Turner is equally applicable to Prisoners‟ equal protection claims.”). 
 
                                                 
3
 Alternatively, we agree with the District Court that Pfender was provided all the 
process that she might have been due under the circumstances.  Pfender argues that 
she was entitled to more formal process under Pennsylvania administrative agency 
law, but this argument finds no support in her brief or in the record before this Court.  
In addition, as the Commonwealth Court found, “Pfender has not set forth any 
Department regulation or policy that otherwise entitles her to an administrative 
hearing upon the removal of her visiting privileges.”  Pfender , 2009 Pa. Commw. 
Unpub. LEXIS 754, at *8.  To the extent that Pfender also challenges the District 
Court‟s analysis by suggesting that it was inconsistent with the alleged damage to her 
reputation, we agree with defendants that this assertion is insufficient to trigger due 
process protection on the record presented here.  See Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 
549 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (“By now it is clear that reputation alone is not an 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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III. 
 We have considered Pfender‟s remaining arguments but find them without merit.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.4 
                                                 
4
 Given our disposition, we do not reach the prison officials‟ alternative argument that 
they are entitled judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 
